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 3 
I. Introduction 
 
 Private international litigations are one of the important aspects of maritime legal 
relations 1. The parties to marine contracts, as well as the persons otherwise connected with 
sea carriage process, frequently sue civil actions in several national courts with claiming 
the reparation for harm (damages) or fulfilling an obligation, from their contractors, also 
from persons in other form obliged before them (claimants). However, in such litigations 
the determination of which country’s court has the jurisdiction to hear the dispute often is 
under active discussion. This is caused by the fact that those disputes have international 
character and involving cross-border elements between two or more states. Thus, the 
selecting of the correct country as the venue of action frequently becomes the subject to 
forum shopping or ambiguity between the litigant parties. 
 The same is with those maritime disputes which involve Georgian and 
simultaneously EU elements.2 Such every specific case might be connected to Georgia and 
an EU Member State whether via the litigation parties (in personam) or via the subject 
matter (in rem) or via both. In the ongoing paper, it will be discussed the aspects of 
jurisdiction of Georgian and EU Member State’s domestic courts when a concrete private 
maritime litigation is linked with Georgia and at the same time with an EU State. In 
particular, the answer will be searched to the next question: which connecting factors are 
necessary to be presented in a dispute derived in connection with maritime legal relations, 
in order that this dispute fell under jurisdiction of national courts of Georgia or of an EU 
State or of both? Furthermore, it should be noted that the paper will not review only cases 
when the litigation is raised between classical participants of marine carriage process, that 
is, charterers, carriers and consignee of goods, passengers, or the like. But it will also 
concern with the jurisdictional issues related to most of the other types of court disputes, 
such as, those engaging marine insurers, insured and assured persons, as well as 
shipowners, employers and ship employees, vessel fuel sales participants, etc. - the most of 
the companies and individuals somehow associated with private maritime legal relations. 
                                                 
1 In the present paper, when mentioning the terms “maritime legal relations”, “marine litigations”, or the like, 
the words  “maritime” and “marine” will be used only in the meaning of private law sense. 
2 In the present paper, when speaking on “EU element”, it will be implied an element related to a Member 
State of the European Union. 
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 The present thesis is designated for the practice lawyers, as well as for other 
persons, being interested or directly engaged in deciding venue of action of litigations that 
regarding. It should be admitted that the discussion of the given topic is much reasonable 
and the paper would be highly demanded. 
 The ongoing work is divided into chapters and sub-chapters. Each chapter concerns 
with the specific aspects of jurisdiction and solves one thematic problem. Relating to sub-
chapters, they serve the resolution of sub-questions united under a chapter’s theme. To the 
extent that the claims of the above-mentioned litigations are, as usual, linked whether to 
performance of lawful duties, or reparation from tortuous conducts, or to contractual 
obligations, to that extent it will be discussed the following three main themes: jurisdiction 
on claim requests on performing the lawful duties, venue of action derived from contractual 
relations and place of court proceedings on recovery of damages coming from tort (delict, 
quasi-delict). 
 The present paper will not discuss the questions when though the dispute at issue is 
somehow connected to Georgia or/and an EU State (for example, party to the dispute is 
national of the EU or Georgia), but venue of action is neither in Georgia nor in European 
Union but is in another world country. In other words, the discussions will be held from the 
angle - when do Georgian/EU States’ domestic courts have jurisdiction over the litigations? 
And not from the point - which country’s courts have jurisdiction? The reason of this 
exclusion from the thesis is that, if not so, it would have been necessary to review the 
national legislations on private international law of wide range of world countries, which 
would lead to overwhelming focusing on flow of laws and taken far away from the main 
topic. 
 The chapters of this thesis are arranged in the following manner: 
First chapter deals with the scope of application of those international and national 
laws which can be used for determination of Georgian and EU States’ domestic courts’ 
jurisdiction over private maritime litigations. 
 Second chapter discusses the issue of Georgian and EU Member States’ courts’ 
jurisdiction on claims of requesting the performance of lawful obligations. 
Third chapter concerns with venue of action matters in contract-based litigations.   
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 And finally, the fourth chapter will concern with the jurisdictional aspects of the 
aforementioned countries’ (Georgia, EU Member States) courts over tort-based claims of 
reparation. 
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II. Legal Sources and Methodology 
 
In the present paper, it will be used the following legal sources: 
 Law of Georgia on Private International Law3 (hereinafter “PIL Act”); 
 Maritime Code of Georgia;4 
 Constitution of Georgia;5 
 Civil Code of Georgia;6 
 Code of Civil Procedure of Georgia7 (hereinafter “CCP”); 
 Tax Code of Georgia;8 
 Law of Georgia on Normative Acts;9 
 Law of Georgia on International Treaties;10 
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (hereinafter “Brussels I”); 
 Agreement of 19 October 2005 between the European Community and the 
Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter “EU-Denmark 
Agreement”); 
 Treaty on European Union; 
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; 
 United Nations Convention of 31 March 1978 on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea11 (hereinafter “Hamburg Rules”); 
 Athens Convention of 13 December 1974 Relating to the Carriage of Passengers 
and their Luggage by Sea12  as amended by Protocol of 19 November 1976 to 
                                                 
3 Act No. 1362, adopted on 29 April 1998, in force since 1 October 1998; 
4 Act No. 715, adopted on 15 May 1997, in force since 1 July 1997; 
5 Adopted on 24 August 1995; 
6 Act No. 786, adopted on 26 June 1997, in force since 25 November 1997; 
7 Act No. 1106, adopted on 14 November 1997, gradually fully entered into force; 
8 Act No. 3591, adopted on 17 September 2010, in force since 1 January 2011; 
9 Act No. 1876, 22 October 2009, gradually fully entered into force; 
10 Act No. 934, adopted on 16 October 1997, fully entered into force on the day of its officially publishing; 
11 in force since 1 November 1992, See: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_rules.html 
12 in force since 28 April 1987, See: 
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/passengers1974.html 
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the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their 
Luggage by Sea 13 (hereinafter “PAL 1974” and “PAL PROT 1976”); 
 Case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ); 
 European Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2010) 1548; 
 BIMCO documents (sample copies of maritime contracts); 
 Nordic Marine Insurance Plan of 2013;14 
 
The method of research of the topic is based on legal analyzes of the afore-listed 
sources. In particular, the arguments are structured by the principle of generalization and 
analytical discussions of the laws as well as the other legal documents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Text Material 
                                                 
13 in force since 30 April 1989, See:  
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/protopassengers1976.html 
14 Agreed between the Nordic Association of Marine Insurance (Cefor), the Danish Shipowners’ Association, 
the Finnish Shipowners’ Association, the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association and the Swedish Shipowners’ 
Association; 
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Chapter 1  
Legal Bases of Georgian and EU Member States’ Courts Jurisdiction over 
 Private International Maritime Litigations: Ambit of Application 
 
1.1 Importance of Clarifying of Applicable Law 
 
In discussing the jurisdiction of Georgian and EU States’ courts over maritime 
cases, it is very much significant to clarify the exact applicable norms determining such 
jurisdiction. This is especially important as the subject matter deals with the private 
international law and is not confined with only one state’s domestic legislation. In the cases 
of aforesaid character, correct classification of the applicable laws is always one big step 
forward for resolving the final question. Else, the facing the serious threat of falling in 
maze of ambiguity of distinguished legislations and concurrent jurisdictions will be 
inevitable.  
Hence, the present chapter will entirely be dedicated to analyses of which norms are 
relevant for deciding the Georgian and EU Member States’ courts jurisdictions on actions 
of marine disputes involving Georgian and EU elements. 
 
 
1.2 Georgian National Legislation 
 
In Georgian domestic legislation, the norms applicable for the issue of Georgian 
courts’ jurisdiction in private international litigations, and amongst them of maritime ones, 
can be found in three statutes as they are: Maritime Code of Georgia, Law of Georgia on 
Private International Law (PIL Act), and Code of Civil Procedure of Georgia (CCP). 
The Maritime Code, in general, is the key statute for regulating the marine legal 
relations; however it does not provide the detailed clauses on jurisdiction. From that 
viewpoint, it only says:  
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“Economical litigations related to seafaring and involving foreign 
individuals or legal entities, by virtue of the agreement between parties, may 
be submitted for judging to foreign court or arbitration.”15  
 
The code does not give the further detailing of jurisdictional issues, for instance, 
what is the issue when there is no “agreement between the parties” on action venue, or 
what are the terms and conditions the agreement on court jurisdiction must satisfy. All 
those answers can be found in PIL Act of Georgia. In particular, the norms on Georgian 
Courts’ international competence are provided in Chapter II of the PIL Act. 
Regarding the hierarchical interdependence of Maritime Code and PIL Act, the 
former indirectly points that the primarily applicable source from Georgian legislation in 
considerations of international jurisdiction of Georgian courts in marine relations is to be 
PIL Act. This is true as from the following:  
 
Maritime Code declares:  
 
“[…] [The Maritime] Code is applied in nautical navigations16 […] by a 
marine ship saved for a special law of Georgia or an international treaty is 
not applicable.17 “ 
 
Clearly, “a special law of Georgia” which regulates Georgia’s courts’ international 
competence is Georgian PIL Act. Therefore, if spoken of Maritime Code’s reference to “a 
special law”, it should be implied a reference to PIL Act. 
And finally, in the beginning of this sub-chapter, it was mentioned the Code of Civil 
Procedure of Georgia as one of the legal bases of Georgian courts’ international 
jurisdiction. The CCP provides: 
 
                                                 
15 See, Article 25, Maritime Code of Georgia; 
16 The term “nautical navigations” is defined in Article 1 of Maritime Code of Georgia and implies 
“utilization of ships for carriage of passengers, cargo, luggage, post, […] [and] for the purpose of towage and 
salvage operations and other economical, scientific and cultural goals.”  
17 See, Article 2, Maritime Code of Georgia; 
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“[Georgian] courts can judge the cases derived from international 
contracts, as well as those of being participated by nationals of foreign 
countries, enterprises and organizations, also by the persons without 
nationality.”18 
 
One way or another, likewise the Maritime Code, the CCP does not give more 
scrutiny on Georgian courts’ international competence. 
To the end, in order to determine Georgian courts’ jurisdiction over private 
international litigations, and amongst them, over those have been raised in connection with 
marine relations, the PIL Act of Georgia comes as main ground among Georgian domestic 
legislation. 
 
 
1.3 EU Law 
 
1.3.1 EU Legislation 
 
On the EU level, the applicable act for regulating of private international maritime 
jurisdiction of the EU Member States’ domestic courts is Brussels I. 
Brussels I applies in civil and commercial matters whatever nature of the court or 
tribunal, excluding arbitration and excepting: revenue, administrative and matrimonial 
matters; the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a 
matrimonial relationship, wills and succession; bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the 
winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, 
compositions and analogous proceedings; and social security.19 Clearly, the marine sphere 
comes into ambit of it. 
Brussels I Regulation came into force on 1 March 2002 and since the time it has 
been binding in its entirety, as well as directly applicable, in all of the EU Member States.20 
The only Member, which acceded later, was Denmark. On 19 October 2005, Denmark 
                                                 
18 See, Article 11(4), Code of Civil Procedure of Georgia; 
19 See, Article 1(1), 1(2), Brussels I Regulation; See also, ibid, Recital 7 and 20; 
20 See, Article 76, Brussels I Regulation; See also, ibid, Recital 6; 
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concluded the agreement with the European Community and accepted Brussels I.21 The 
Agreement came into effect on 1 July 2007.22 Though, under that agreement, Denmark 
made some reservations to the application of several norms of the Regulation, nevertheless, 
they are not in concern with the topic of this paper. 
Here, one may ask: Is Brussels I applicable only for EU nationals and companies or 
is it also relevant for regulating the relations involving third country persons and amongst 
them the Georgian ones? The answer on this question is as follow: 
 
The European Commission in the Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation declared: 
 
“The specific objective [of the operation of Brussels I in the international 
legal order] is to improve access to justice, legal certainty, and protection of 
EU citizens and companies in disputes connected with third States.”23 
 
Also, 
 
“[…] the introduction of a forum geared specifically at non-EU defendants 
would improve access to justice for companies from those Member States 
which currently do not have comparable provisions in their national law.”24 
 
Obviously, as it is derived from the foregoing that, in terms of jurisdictional issues, 
Brussels I is applied also in the cases where a party to the dispute is not the national 
of/registered in the European Union. This is further proved from the ECJ judgments on 
separate articles of the Regulation (see, below). However, in order that the Regulation were 
                                                 
21 See, Article 2(1), EU-Denmark Agreement; 
22 See, Article 12(2), EU-Denmark Agreement; See also, ‘Information concerning the date of entry into force 
of the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters’, Official Journal of the European 
Union, 4 April 2007, L 94/70; 
23 See, European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2010) 1548, Brussels, 14 December 
2010, paragraph 2.2.2 and heading of paragraph 2.2; 
24 See, European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2010) 1548, Brussels, 14 December 
2010, paragraph 2.2.4(b)(iii); 
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applicable, in any case, it is crucially necessary that the dispute party had the specific 
connection to an EU Member State or the litigation in question were, to some extent, 
related to a Member State. The cases of such connection, as provided in the Regulation, 
might be, for example: when the place of domicile of the party to a dispute is in a Member 
State,25 or, for instance, when the venue of performance of the contract giving rise to 
litigation is in a Member State.26 As a rule, the provisions of jurisdiction laid down by 
Brussels I are founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the 
defendant’s domicile (forum domicili), but complemented and derogated by the rules of 
special jurisdiction.27 All those and other cases of the mentioned connections will be 
detailed reviewed during the discussions in the ongoing paper. 
To this end, Brussels I Regulation is to be regarded as the principal legal basis, 
among the EU legislation, for deciding the EU countries’ courts jurisdiction over maritime 
disputes involving foreign elements linked to Georgia. 
 
1.3.2 ECJ Case Law 
 
The purpose of Brussels I Regulation is to set the common and solid rules on 
jurisdiction for the EU Member States courts, in order to avoid the ambiguity in venue of 
claim choice for litigants, and concurrent jurisdiction among courts. This is more clearly 
enunciated in case law of the European Court of Justice: 
 
“[…] [Brussels I Regulation] seeks to unify the rules of conflict of 
jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters by way of rules of jurisdiction 
which are highly predictable. […] Accordingly, Regulation [...] pursues an 
objective of legal certainty which consists in strengthening the legal 
protection of persons established in the European Community [European 
Union], by enabling the applicant to identify easily the court in which he 
                                                 
25 See, for example, Article 2(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
26 See, for example, Article 5(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
27 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-103/05, 13 July 2006, paragraph 22; See also, ECJ judgment on Case C-
386/05, 3 May 2007, paragraph 21; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-533/07, 23 April 2009, paragraph 23; 
See also, Recital 11, Brussels I Regulation; 
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may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee before which court he may 
be sued […].”28 
 
Besides, in relation to “special jurisdiction rules” the Court held: 
 
“[…] The special rules on jurisdiction [are required to be] interpreted in 
such a way as to enable a normally well-informed defendant reasonably to 
foresee before which courts, other than those of the State in which he is 
domiciled, he may be sued.”29 
 
Obviously, for applying of any legal norm, one of the key issues always is how that 
norm is interpreted. In other words, it is almost impossible to rely on a norm if the true 
meaning and essence of it is misunderstood. That principle operates also, as it is derived 
from above, with Brussels I in deciding the jurisdictional questions of EU Member States’ 
courts. The main body in EU, which interprets the Union law, is the European Court of 
Justice. One of the functions of ECJ is to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of 
Union law.30 In interpreting the European Union law, and amongst them the Brussels I 
Regulation, the ECJ considers not only the wording of the law in question, but also the 
context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part.31  
Therefore, the ECJ case law on Brussels I Regulation has much relevance and 
significance in defining the venue of action in several situations being discussed in this 
paper. 
                                                 
28 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-533/07, 23 April 2009, paragraphs 21 and 22; See also, ECJ Judgment on 
Case C-386/05, 3 May 2007, paragraphs 19 and 20; See also, Recitals 2 and 11, Brussels I Regulation; 
29 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-103/05, 13 July 2006, paragraph 25; 
30 See, Article 19(3)(b), Treaty on European Union; See also, Article 267, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union; 
31 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-533/08, 4 May 2010, paragraph 44; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case 292/82, 
17 November 1983, paragraph 12; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-136/91, 1 April 1993, paragraph 11; 
See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-223/98, 14 October 1999, paragraph 23; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case 
C-301/98, 18 May 2000, paragraph 21; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-156/98, 19 September 2000, 
paragraph 50; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-53/05, 6 July 2006, paragraph 20; See also, ECJ Judgment 
on Case C-300/05, 23 November 2006, paragraph 15; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-306/05, 7 
December 2007, paragraph 34; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-298/07, 16 October 2008, paragraph 15; 
See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-466/07, 12 February 2009, paragraph 37; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case 
C-301/08, 22 October 2009, paragraph 39; See also, ECJ Judgment on Joined Cases C-402/07 and C-432/07, 
19 November 2009, paragraph 41; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-403/09 PPU, 23 December 2009, 
paragraph 33; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-162/09, 7 October 2010, paragraph 49; 
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The important factor has the case law of the European Court of Justice passed also 
in relation to Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter “Brussels 
Convention”). It is true that Brussels Convention itself is not applicable in jurisdictional 
issues for Georgian courts, because Georgia is not a party to it (Convention), however, here 
it is considerable the factor of influence of ECJ rulings’ for Convention, on Brussels I 
Regulation, as follow: 
 
“[…] In so far as Regulation No 44/2001 replaces the 1968 Brussels 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters […] interpretation provided by the Court in respect of 
the provisions of the Brussels Convention is also valid for those of 
Regulation No 44/2001 whenever the provisions of those instruments may be 
regarded as equivalent […]”.32 
 
Consequently, ECJ judgments interpreting Brussels Convention, in some occasions 
and in particular, where the Convention and Regulation are equivalent, are means of 
interpretation also for Brussels I and thus are, in many cases, relevant for determining the 
place of private marine claims involving EU and Georgian elements. 
 
1.4 International Treaties 
 
International treaties providing jurisdictional aspects in private international 
maritime litigations and, simultaneously, being in force for Georgia are: Hamburg Rules33 
and PAL 197434 (as amended by PAL PROT 197635). 
                                                 
32 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-533/08, 4 May 2010, paragraph 36; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-
189/08, 16 July 2009, paragraph 18; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-180/06, 14 May 2009, paragraph 41; 
33 For Georgia in force since 1 April 1997, for the status see: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_status.html 
For the status see also: 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20XI/XI-D-3.en.pdf 
34 For Georgia in force since 23 November 1995, for the status see page 304 at: 
http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/statusofconventions/documents/status%20-%202012.pdf 
35 For Georgia in force since 23 November 1995, for the status see page 308 at: 
http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/statusofconventions/documents/status%20-%202012.pdf 
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Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974 design partly distinguished from PIL Act of Georgia 
rules on court jurisdiction. That is to say, in some occasions, they match with PIL Act’s 
considerations, whereas, in some cases, they “throw” those certain litigations into Georgian 
courts’ jurisdictional area, which are not so provided by PIL Act (see, below). 
Respectively, in this connection, the reasonable question can be raised: what is the place of 
international treaties and among them that of Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974 in the 
legislative system of Georgia, and how those treaties influence on Georgian courts while 
setting the jurisdiction on every concrete maritime claim? That question can be answered in 
the following manner: 
Above, in Chapter 1.2, it was discussed the reference of Georgian Maritime Code to 
PIL Act, the latter as the preferential over the former. In the same reference, attention is 
drawn also on the international treaties contracted by Georgia and it is provided that as well 
as such treaties have the preference in relation to Maritime Code.36 This is further proved 
from another declaration of Maritime Code:  
 
“If an international treaty or convention, Georgia is a party to, provides a 
distinguished rule other than [the Maritime] Code [of Georgia], such treaty 
or convention is applied.”37 
 
Moreover, the Code specially refers to Hamburg Rules and declares:  
 
“[…] in Georgia it is applied United Nations Convention of 1978 on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (the “Hamburg Rules”).”38 
 
Indeed, in Georgia’s legal system, the international conventions and treaties binding 
Georgia are directly and hierarchically primarily applicable than the national legislation.  
In other words, Georgia, in terms of implementation of international law, is a 
monist state and the international norms are directly enforceable in the country. From that 
viewpoint, the Law of Georgia on International Treaties provides: 
                                                 
36 See, above, Chapter 1.2, discussion on Article 2 of Maritime Code of Georgia; 
37 See, Article 26, Maritime Code of Georgia; 
38 See, Article 114(3), Maritime Code of Georgia; 
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“An international treaty, Georgia is a party to, is an inseparable part of 
Georgian legislation. […] Officially published provisions of an 
international treaty Georgia is a party to, which set forth exact rights and 
obligations and do not need more specifying by adopting a national law, 
directly operate in Georgia.”39 
 
Besides, the Constitution of Georgia and Law of Georgia on Normative Acts 
declare: 
 
“[…] an international treaty or an international agreement, Georgia is a 
party to, unless it is inconformity with the Constitution of Georgia, with an 
Amending Act of the Constitution or with a Constitutional Agreement, is 
primary over the national normative acts.”40 
 
Furthermore, the PIL Act holds: 
 
“Rules provided in international treaties have the primary force over the 
rules designed by [the PIL Act of Georgia].”41 (Certainly, in the words 
“international treaties”, under this norm of PIL Act, is implied only those 
international treaties by which Georgia is bound and not abstractly all the 
inter-state treaties around the world). 
 
Therefore, from all the foregoing, the Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974 are directly 
and preferentially applicable for Georgian courts in accepting the jurisdiction on claims 
taken by litigation parties on reliance of those two conventions. 
There is also another question: does the fact of preference of Hamburg Rules and 
PAL 1974 over PIL Act of Georgia imply that, in deciding the issues, only the Hamburg 
                                                 
39 See, Articles 6(1) and 6(3), Law of Georgia on International Treaties; 
40 See, Article 7(5), Law of Georgia on Normative Acts; See also, ibid, Articles 3(4) and 7(3); See also, 
Article 6(2), Constitution of Georgia; See also, Article 6(2), Law of Georgia on International Treaties;  
41 See, Article 2, PIL Act of Georgia; 
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Rules and PAL 1974 are applicable and PIL Act should be disregarded? This question 
should be explained in the following way: 
In some occasions the mentioned conventions and PIL Act give the similar 
provisions whereas in other cases they fill each other. That is to say, they (the conventions 
and PIL Act) do not come into incompliance with one to another and do not set the 
concurrent jurisdictional rules. The only fact that the wordings of those international and 
domestic documents are different does not give the ground for negligence of applicability 
either the former or the latter. Consequently, a claimant in every concrete situation (in 
deciding the venue of action derived from marine relations) may rely as on the conventions 
as on the PIL Act as on both. 
 
With respect to EU Member States as bound by the Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974, 
they are: 
 Hamburg Rules: entered into force for Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Romania.42 
 PAL 1974: is binding for Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, 
Luxemburg, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom;43 (Those countries are 
bound also by PAL PROT 1976 and, thus, the amendments taken by PAL 
PROT 1976 to PAL 1974 are in force for them as well44.). 
 
Here, one may ask: In deciding the claim place, can the courts of the above-referred 
EU Member States be guided by the aforesaid conventions or they, in any case, are bound 
only by the Brussels I Regulation? 
Brussels I Regulation does not preclude EU Members, in the relations with non-EU 
countries, from applying the rules laid down by the specific international treaties (and 
                                                 
42 See: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_status.html 
See also: 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20XI/XI-D-3.en.pdf 
43 See, page 304 at: 
http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/statusofconventions/documents/status%20-%202012.pdf 
44 See, page 308 at: 
http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/statusofconventions/documents/status%20-%202012.pdf 
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among them the Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974), while a question is being raised to 
determining the court jurisdiction. In particular, the Regulation says: 
 
“[…] [Brussels I] shall not affect any conventions to which the Member 
States are parties and which in relation to particular matters, govern 
jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments. […] [This] 
shall be applied in the following manner: […] [Brussels I] Regulation shall 
not prevent a court of a Member State, which is a party to a convention on a 
particular matter, from assuming jurisdiction in accordance with that 
convention, even where the defendant is domiciled in another Member State 
which is not a party to that convention.”45  
 
At the same time, the aforesaid provision of the Regulation is interpreted in such a 
way that “in relation to matters governed by specialised conventions, for the application of 
those conventions, the fact remains that their application cannot compromise the principles 
which underlie judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters in the European Union, 
such as the principles […] of free movement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
predictability as to the courts having jurisdiction and therefore legal certainty for litigants, 
sound administration of justice, minimisation of the risk of concurrent proceedings, and 
mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union.”46 
 In connection to Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974, it is difficult to say whether they 
compromise the principles of predictability, sound administration of justice, etc. counted in 
the above-pointed ECJ judgment. With this respect the European Court of Justice has not 
tested those conventions. In the future they may become under the considerations of the 
Court, however, until now, it should be supposed that Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974 are in 
full compliance with the said principles and they may be freely applied by the domestic 
courts of those EU States for which they are in force.  
 
                                                 
45 See, Article 71(1) and 71(2)(a), Brussels I Regulation; See also, ibid, Recital 25; 
46 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-533/08, 4 May 2010, paragraph 49; 
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 To the end, the international treaties, in particular Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974 
giving their own aspects (those aspects in details will be reviewed below) of jurisdiction in 
certain private maritime international litigations, are applicable for Georgian and to-them-
contracting EU Member States courts, together with respectively Georgian national 
legislation and Brussels I Regulation. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Jurisdiction on Claims with Request of  
Performing of Lawful Obligations 
 
 20 
2.1 Concept of Claim on Performance of Lawful Obligation 
 
 Before starting the discussions on issues of jurisdiction on marine litigations with a 
claim of request on performance of lawful obligations, it is to be explained the concept of 
“lawful obligation” and “claim with requesting of its performance”.  
 In maritime law and marine carriage world practice, there are a lot of normative 
documents which grant the participants of legal relations several rights and obligations. 
Sometimes those documents have domestic legislative character whereas in other occasions 
they might be international treaties, conventions, etc. Clearly, in the concept of “lawful 
obligation” it should be implied exactly the obligations which flow from such legal acts of 
mandatory nature and are conferred to the parties of a marine legal relations by the force of 
law and not, for example, of a contract. Correspondingly, the request of performance of a 
lawful obligation is to have meaning that the claim at issue is aiming to, by the force of the 
court judgment, compelling a defendant to act in compliance with its (maritime) lawful 
obligation (for instance, to bring cargo in another port, because law requires that he must 
act so in case of claimant’s wish); in other words the claim in question is not purposing 
(seeking) to make defendant fulfill a contract or pay recoveries resulted from tort or 
because of the breach of contract or of law.  
 It should be also noted that in several marine relations (for example, in carriage of 
general cargo) when parties make an agreement and conclude a contract, sometimes such a 
contract (for instance, some bill of lading contracts) does not have a written form and the 
provisions of it are not declared on a paper. But the detailed regulations of such a 
contractual relation, as a rule, are contained in domestic or international legal acts, as well 
as derive from the trade customs applied on the concrete territorial area. Respectively, here 
it is raised a question: are the claims of performance of such contracts whether a claim of 
performance of lawful obligation or claim on fulfillment of contractual one? The answer is 
not simple; thought, to the opinion of the author of this thesis, the mentioned claims should 
be equalized to the claims on performance of lawful obligations. The argument of that is 
that: in the given situations the focus should be drawn on the source of the obligation at 
issue and not on the formal side of the parties’ legal relation. It is true that here the persons 
have a contractual deal, but the detailed provisions of such deal come from a law and not 
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from a contract. Consequently, the given claims should be considered to be raised in 
connection with fulfillment of lawful duties and not of contractual obligations. 
  And finally, one may ask: in “lawful obligations” is it implied only duties coming 
from mandatory laws or as well as the obligations flowing from the marine trade customs 
and practice? The approach of the author of the ongoing paper is that: if the duty has 
mandatory character than it should be regarded as lawful obligation despite the fact that it 
is based on custom. This is true because in such occasion it must be decisive not the 
technical name of the source (law, custom) of the duty, but the obligatory essence of the 
given source. However, the determination of the mandatory nature of each concrete 
obligation should always be the subject of factual assessment in every specific situation. 
To this end, in this chapter, in the concept of “lawful obligation” it should be meant 
all kinds of duties which are “fed” by the national or international mandatory maritime laws 
or customs, but not by provisions of a contract. Respectively, in “the jurisdiction on claims 
requesting the performance of lawful obligations” it is to be implied the jurisdictional 
aspects on those court actions where the claimant requests that the defendant fulfill that 
lawful obligation of him (of defendant) which derives from a specific maritime domestic or 
international law or custom. 
 
 
2.2 Jurisdiction of Georgian Courts under  
Georgian National Legislation 
 
As it is pointed above, in Chapter 1, venue of action at Georgian courts, of 
litigations derived from private international maritime relations (and among the claims with 
request of performing of marine lawful obligations), must be determined by the PIL Act of 
Georgia and, in several occasions, by Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974. In this sub-chapter, 
the discussions will be held from the angle of PIL Act, and Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974 
will be subjects of considerations of Chapters 2.4 and 2.5. 
PIL Act of Georgia provides:  
 
 22 
“Georgian courts have international jurisdiction, if the defendant is 
domiciled or has place of residence or habitual placement in Georgia.”47 
 
That provision applies to not only the actions with claiming the performance of 
lawful duties, but also to disputes originated from contractual obligations or tortuous 
conducts.  
Here, a question is to be raised: what does it imply in terms: defendant’s “place of 
domicile”, “place of residence” and “habitual placement”? 
In this regard, Georgian national legislation does not give the clear answer, but it 
defines the alike terms (more or less being close to the aforesaid terms of PIL Act), that is: 
“place of domicile of an individual”, “factual placement of an individual” and “place of 
residence of a legal entity”. 
Under the Civil Code of Georgia: 
 
“A place of domicile of an individual is considered the place which is 
usually chosen for living, by that individual. An individual may have 
several places of domicile.”48 
 
According to the Tax Code of Georgia: 
 
“A place of domicile of an individual is considered the place which is 
usually chosen for living, by that individual, as well as his factual 
placement”.49 “Factual placement of an individual, who is regularly 
displaced because of his work, is considered the place where he factually 
lives or is registered according to the relevant rules of registration.”50 
 
Under the Civil Code: 
 
                                                 
47 See, Article 8, PIL Act of Georgia; 
48 See, Article 20(1), Civil Code of Georgia; 
49 See, Article 35(1), Tax Code of Georgia; 
50 See, Article 35(4), Tax Code of Georgia; 
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“A place of residence of a legal entity is considered the place of location 
of its administration. A legal entity may have only one place of residence 
(legal address). Other place would be considered as the place of residence 
of its branch.”51 
  
If analyze the aforesaid provisions, it can be drawn the following conclusions: 
 First, the place of registration of an individual can always be regarded as the 
“factual placement” of that individual, and, hence, as his “place of domicile” (Tax Code, 
above). However, individual’s place of domicile is not always his place of registration 
(Civil Code, Tax Code). 
 Second, place where an individual factually lives is always his “place of domicile” 
(Civil Code, Tax Code), but the place of domicile is not always the place where an 
individual factually lives (in other words, place of domicile might be also a place of 
registration where an individual has simply been registered but does not live; Tax Code). 
The decision on whether the individual factually lives on a specific place is the subject of 
separate assessment in every concrete case. 
And third, a place of residence of a legal entity is to be considered his legal address. 
The other places are considered as the places of residence of its branch (Civil Code). Under 
national procedural rules, a legal address is given to a legal entity in the process of its 
registration. 
 One way or another, the exact definitions of terms - defendant’s “place of 
domicile”, “place of residence” and “habitual placement” - of PIL Act is ambiguous. 
Neither the author of this paper has the precise answer. 
 PIL Act of Georgia, besides the aforesaid provision on jurisdiction mentioned in the 
beginning of this sub-chapter, provides also additional occasions under which a litigation, 
and among them that of maritime character, may be brought for judging to Georgian courts. 
In particular, Georgian courts have international competence in addition when: 
 the litigation in question involves number of defendants (two or more) and one 
of the defendants is domiciled or has place of residence or habitual placement in 
Georgia; or 
                                                 
51 See, Article 26, Civil Code of Georgia; 
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 the litigation is related to the branch of that company which has the place of 
residence in Georgia;52 (Obviously, the wording “litigation is related” is 
likewise ambiguous because it might mean as the litigation is related to a lawful 
obligation of the branch, as litigation is related to the right on claim for the 
branch’s parent body, etc. Clear answer is not found on this question as well.). 
 
And finally, again, besides the aforesaid regulations of PIL Act discussed in this 
sub-chapter, Georgian courts may have jurisdiction additionally over the claims raised on 
reliance of Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974. As already mentioned, the aspects of 
jurisdiction of those two conventions will be discussed below.  
Consequently, Georgian domestic legislation gives partly clear partly equivocal 
determination of Georgian court’s international competence on private maritime litigations 
and among them those of engaging claims on request of performance of lawful obligations. 
This is a legal gap of national law, which must be quickly eradicated. Otherwise, the 
persons of marine legal relations willing to sue court proceedings will face the trouble of 
selecting the proper venue of action. It is also a risk that they become “victims” of 
concurrent jurisdiction between a court of Georgia and that of an EU Member State. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Jurisdiction of EU Member States’  
Courts under Brussels I 
 
 2.3.1 General Approach of Brussels I 
 
 General approach of Brussels I is that: 
                                                 
52 See, Article 9, PIL Act of Georgia; 
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 A plaintiff should sue a claim in the courts of that EU Member State where the 
defendant is domiciled; (nationality of the defendant is not taken into 
consideration);53 
 But if a defendant is not domiciled in either EU Member State, than the 
jurisdiction of the courts of each EU State is determined by its national 
legislation.54  
 
That approach of the Regulation is derived from its rules of “general jurisdiction” 
provided in Section I of Chapter II (Articles 2-4) and is applicable not only for claims of 
request of performance lawful obligations, but also to defining the action venue in tort or 
contract-based litigations. 
It is notable that aforementioned rules of Brussels I apply at all the existence of an 
international element.55 In other words, they are similarly applicable in proceedings where 
the parties before the courts of an EU Member State are domiciled in that State and the 
litigation between them has certain connections with a third non-EU state.56 The 
involvement of an EU Member State and a non-Member State, for example because the 
claimant and one defendant are domiciled in the first State and the events at issue occurred 
in the second, makes the legal relationship at issue international in nature.57 That situation 
is such as to raise questions in the EU State relating to the determination of international 
jurisdiction, which is precisely one of the objectives of the Brussels I Regulation.58 
Clearly, if adjust the aforesaid to private marine litigations involving Georgian and 
EU elements, it would be obvious that in order that the concrete EU Member State’s court 
hear the concrete marine case, it is not urgently necessary that both the claimant and the 
respondent were domiciled in European Union or all the elements of the litigation in 
question were connected to the EU, but factor of only respondent’s domicile in the 
European Union (in particular, in the Member State where the claim is brought) is already 
sufficient. 
                                                 
53 See, Article 1(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
54 See, Article 4(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
55 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-281/02, 1 March 2005, paragraph 25; 
56 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-281/02, 1 March 2005, paragraph 35 and Summary of the Judgment; 
57 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-281/02, 1 March 2005, paragraph 26; 
58 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-281/02, 1 March 2005, paragraph 26; 
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 With respect to the situations when a defendant is not domiciled in the European 
Union, in such occasions application of the national rules on jurisdiction rather than the 
uniform rules of Brussels I is possible only if the court seized of the case holds firm 
evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant is in fact domiciled outside the 
European Union.59 In the absence of such firm evidence, the international jurisdiction of a 
court of an EU State is established by virtue of Brussels I Regulation and saved for that the 
conditions for application of one of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Regulation are 
met.60 
 That means that in every concrete case, the authority of determining the defendant’s 
domicile place lies on the domestic court (the court of an EU Member State) potentially 
will hear the action, which must investigate the question with due diligence and strengthen 
the decision on jurisdiction with strong evidence.  
Here, it should also be pointed that, in the process of defining the respondent’s 
domicile place, for such definition it should be applied the rules of internal law of that EU 
State where the action has been brought.61 But if a respondent is not domiciled in the 
Member State whose courts are seized of the matter, then, in order to determine whether 
the respondent is domiciled in another Member State, the court shall apply the law of the 
latter (of the another Member State).62 Anyway, the Regulation still provides some special 
rules in regard to the determination of certain persons’ domicile place, in particular of legal 
entities. Under Brussels I, a company or other legal person or association of natural or legal 
persons is supposed domiciled at the place where it has its: statutory seat, central 
administration, or principal place of business.63 With this respect, for the United Kingdom 
and Ireland “statutory seat” means:  
 the registered office; or  
 where there is no such office anywhere, the place of incorporation; or 
 where there is no such place anywhere, the place under the law of which the 
formation took place.64  
                                                 
59 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-292/10, 15 March 2012, paragraph 40; 
60 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-292/10, 15 March 2012, paragraph 41; 
61 See, Article 59(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
62 See, Article 59(2), Brussels I Regulation; 
63 See, Article 60(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
64 See, Article 60(2), Brussels I Regulation; 
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To this end, according to the general approach of Brussels I on defining the 
jurisdiction of EU Member States courts, the plaintiff of a litigation related to request of 
performance of maritime lawful obligations can sue a claim in the court of that EU State 
where the defendant has statutory seat, central administration, principal place of business or 
otherwise is domiciled in that EU Member State. However, this rule is derogated when the 
defendant is not the domicile of the European Union. 
 
2.3.2 Complements to General Approach of Brussels I 
 
 In spite of the fact that, under general approach (above) of Brussels I, a venue of 
action is primarily attributed to that EU State where the defendant is domiciled, in some 
specific occasions a plaintiff can choose, besides the defendant’s domicile place, to claim 
as well as at the other EU Member States’ courts. With this respect, the Regulation 
envisages several complementing norms, which will be brought below. However, in the 
beginning it should be noted, that, one way or another, such complementing rules of 
Brussels I applies only if the defendant is domiciled in the European Union (except from 
with actions relating to limitation of liability from use or operation of a ship; see, below).65  
 One of the types of the mentioned complementing norms is linked to litigations 
arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment of a person (company). 
In this connection, Brussels I provides that a claim against such person, may be brought to 
that EU Member State in which his branch, agency or establishment is situated even if the 
said person himself is not domiciled in that State.66  
The second example of complementation to the general approach of Brussels I is 
the rule of jurisdiction on disputes when an injured party (requesting from defendant to 
perform his lawful obligations) takes a direct action versus the marine insurer (it is implied 
the liability insurer). In such situation the injured party is allowed to bring proceedings 
against the liability insurer: 
 in that EU State where the injured party is intending to sue the insured;67 or 
                                                 
65 See, first indent of Article 5, as well as Articles 7 and 8, Brussels I Regulation; 
66 See, Article 5(5), Brussels I Regulation; 
67 See, Article 11(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
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 in that EU State where the insured has given occurrence the harmful event 
(which is subject to insurance agreement between the insured and insurer).68 
(Certainly, for bringing the direct actions in the mentioned EU States, it is also 
necessary that the domestic law of the forum State permits direct actions at 
all.69).  
 
 The next occasion of complementary jurisdiction is relating claims on payment of 
remuneration in respect of salvage of a cargo or of freight, at sea. Brussels I directly 
provides that such actions can be brought to the court under the authority of which the 
cargo or freight has been arrested to secure the payment (or could have been so arrested, 
but bail or other security has been given), saved for that it is claimed that the defendant has 
an interest in the cargo or freight or had such an interest at the time of salvage.70 
And finally, with respect to the claims for limitation of lawful liability from the use 
or operation of a ship, Brussels I additionally throws such claims into the jurisdiction of 
that EU Member State’s court where the action itself on the liability is heard.71 
To this end, Brussels I, besides the defendant’s forum domicili principle, further 
gives the certain range of complementary regulations which enable a claimant to take an 
action in different venues inside the EU, in taking into consideration the essence and nature 
of the litigation at issue. Respectively, a plaintiff, while the claim concerns with the request 
of fulfillment of maritime lawful obligation, can choose to claim whether in the court of the 
defendant’s domicile EU State or in another EU country as it is provided by the aforesaid 
complementing rules of the Regulation. Clearly, such broadening of the optional area is 
stipulated by the aim of the Brussels I to provide the flexible system of forum designation 
and avoid the obstacles for the dispute parties in litigation process. 
 
 
2.4 Jurisdiction under Hamburg Rules 
 
                                                 
68 See, Articles 11(2) and 10, Brussels I Regulation; 
69 See, Articles 11(1) and 11(2), Brussels I Regulation; 
70 See, Article 5(7), Brussels I Regulation; 
71 See, Article 7, Brussels I Regulation; 
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 As referred in Chapter 1.4, Georgia and several EU Member States are bound by the 
convention of Hamburg Rules and make its provisions valid for the courts of the 
Contracting States. On the other hand, the Convention itself gives the courts of its 
contracting countries rules of jurisdiction in addition to those claims which are not falling 
into their (court’s) jurisdictional area in accordance with Brussels I and national 
legislations. 
 Article 21 of Hamburg Rules convention regulates the issue of venue of action 
when disputes are linked to carriage of goods by sea of those legal relations which are set 
on the ground of the Convention. Respectively, this means that the parties to a dispute, in 
bringing a claim on performance of lawful obligations, can rely on jurisdictional provisions 
of Hamburg Rules only if the claim is based on the request of performance of the norms of 
exactly the Convention and not on the fulfillment of lawful obligations derived from any 
other mandatory law. 
 With respect to the circle of private persons (plaintiffs and defendants) to which the 
Convention is applicable, under Hamburg Rules it is determined broadly, in the following 
manner: 
 
“The provisions of this Convention [Hamburg Rules] are applicable 
without regard to the nationality of the ship, the carrier, the actual 
carrier, the shipper, the consignee or any other interested person.”72 
 
 Regarding to venue of action, under Hamburg Rules, in matters relating to claims 
on performance of Conventional obligations, it can be: (a)  
 the principal place of business or, in the absence thereof, the habitual residence 
of the defendant; or 
 the port of loading or the port of discharge of goods of carriage.73  
 
A plaintiff has an option to choose whether at which of the aforesaid places he 
institutes an action.74 
                                                 
72 See, Article 2(2), Hamburg Rules; 
73 See, Articles 21(1)(a) and 21(1)(c), Hamburg Rules; 
74 See, first indent of Article 21(1), Hamburg Rules; 
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And finally, it should be also pointed that the above-mentioned rules on jurisdiction 
of Hamburg Rules apply to not only to the claims which request the performance of the 
Conventional provisions from the defendant, but also to all actions related to any 
Convention-based (based on the Hamburg Rules) liability of the defendant (including 
contractual liabilities or the other). 
 
 
2.5 Jurisdiction under PAL 1974 
 
 Convention of PAL 1974 regulates the relations of international carriage of 
passengers and their luggage by sea. In defining the court jurisdiction in non-contract based 
litigations with claims on request of performance of its (PAL 1974) provisions, PAL 1974 
is applicable for all litigations if they are derived from the carriage by that ship which flies 
the flag of or is registered in a State Party to the Convention.75  
Notwithstanding, PAL 1974 is not applied: 
 when the carriage is subject to a civil liability regime, under any other 
international convention concerning the carriage of passengers or luggage by 
another mode of transport; and  
 Simultaneously, the said “other convention” has mandatory application to 
carriage by sea.76 
 
(Clearly, above, in the phrase “any other international convention” it is not implied 
Brussels I Regulation in the sense of application to court jurisdictional matters, because 
Brussels I is the EU internal regulatory act and not “international convention”). 
According to PAL 1974, a plaintiff, at his option, may bring an action on the 
performance of defendant’s Conventional obligations to the domestic court of that 
Contracting State in which: 
 the place of permanent residence or principal place of business of the defendant 
is; or 
                                                 
75 See, Article 2(1)(a), PAL 1974; 
76 See, Article 2(2), PAL 1974; 
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 the domicile or permanent residence of the claimant is; (in this last case the 
claim can be brought if, at the same time, in the action State the defendant has a 
place of business and is subject to jurisdiction in that State);77  
 
Likewise the Hamburg Rules, the abovementioned rules of jurisdiction of PAL 
1974 is applicable also to contract-based or other type maritime claims, and not only to 
those which request the performance of Conventional obligations beyond the contract.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Jurisdiction on Litigations Derived from  
Contractual Obligations  
 
3.1. Categories of Contracts in Maritime Relations 
 
Before starting the discussions of jurisdictional issues in litigations derived from 
contractual relations in maritime relations, it is worth to categorize and briefly describe the 
essence and content of most types of contracts are, in practice, concluded in private 
                                                 
77 See, Articles 17(1)(a) and 17(1)(c), PAL 1974; 
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maritime sphere. This will assist in discussions on court jurisdiction below in this chapter, 
because the venue of action in disputes of contractual relations is frequently determined 
according to a contract’s type and content. 
Contracts in practice basically utilized in marine relations may be categorized in the 
following manner:78 
 Service contracts (contracts on providing service): one of the extensively 
applied agreements. Under this category it can be unified: the charter parties 
(excluding bareboat charter parties), contracts on carriage of general cargo, 
contracts on carriage of passengers, salvage and towage agreements, ship repair 
contracts, ship agency contracts, contracts on crew management service (service 
for providing the bring-up of the proper crew for a ship); 
 Employment contracts: contracts on employment between the employer 
(mostly a shipwoner) and crew members; employment contracts of security 
guards on vessel; 
 Insurance contracts: ship insurance contracts, cargo insurance contracts, 
liability insurance contracts; 
 Sales of goods contracts: bunker contracts on sale of fuel for a ship; 
 Ship-hiring contracts: bareboat charter parties. 
 
  That list and categories of contracts is the most part of the agreements used in 
connection to maritime legal relations. Bellow, the discussions will be held on court 
jurisdiction in regard to litigations derived with respect to the breach or fulfillment of the 
aforesaid types of agreements (contracts). 
 
 
3.2 Jurisdiction of EU Member States’  
Courts under Brussels I 
 
3.2.1 Common Approach of Brussels I to Jurisdiction on Contractual 
Litigations 
                                                 
78 See, BIMCO documents (sample copies of maritime contracts) at: [https://www.bimco.org/]; 
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In relation to the litigations derived from the breach of or request of performance of 
contractual obligations, the Brussels I sets forth the rules of special jurisdiction and gives 
the plaintiff the option to sue the defendant at as well as other EU Member States’ court 
rather than strictly only at the court of the defendant’s domicile country. The general 
provisions of regulating this matter lay down in Article 5(1) of Brussels I.  
Under Article 5(1), in matters relating to a contract a claimant can sue the defendant 
in the court of that Member State where the place of performance of the contractual 
obligation in question is/was.79 Here, at the same time, it should be pointed that, in order 
that the given court have jurisdiction via Article 5(1), the defendant at case, simultaneously, 
must have the domicile place in the European Union.80 
As the European Court of Justice stated, “cases of special jurisdiction [and among 
them those of contractual litigations], the choice of which is a matter for the plaintiff, are 
based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and 
courts other than those of the defendant’s domicile, which justifies the attribution of 
jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and 
the efficacious conduct of proceedings.”81 Clearly, in regard to contractual disputes’ 
jurisdiction, the Regulation follows the forum connexitatis principle that is motivated to 
promote the effective realization of justice and to maximally possibly simplify the access to 
court. The same concerns with the litigations derived from agreements used in maritime 
sphere. In the following sub-chapters, it will be discussed the elements and specifications 
of jurisdictional issues of such litigations. 
 
3.2.2 Matters Relating to a Contract 
 
One of the elements of special jurisdiction on contractual litigations, under Brussels 
I, is the requirement that the matter of a dispute be related to the contract. The concept of 
“matters relating to a contract” is not an issue of factual assessment of each concrete 
                                                 
79 See, Article 5(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
80 See, first indent of Article 5, Brussels I Regulation; 
81 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-220/88, 11 January 1990, paragraph 17; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case 
21/76, 30 November 1976, paragraphs 10-11; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-68/93, 7 March 1995, 
paragraph 19; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-364/93, 19 September 1995, paragraph 10; 
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situation, but is the subject to specific interpretation of the EU authorities (and primarily of 
the ECJ), which is clearly derived from the case law of the European Court of Justice: 
 
“[The concept of “matters relating to a contract” in Article 5(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation] should not be interpreted simply as referring to the 
national law of one or other of the Member States concerned, […] [but] the 
concept […] should be regarded as an independent concept which, for the 
purposes of the application of the Convention [Regulation], must be 
interpreted by reference chiefly to the system and objectives of the 
Convention [of the Regulation], in order to ensure that it is fully 
effective.”82 
 
Consequently, if any EU State’s domestic court or a Georgian one, in its original 
way, defines the said concept, the definition in question will not be regarded as proper for 
the scope of the Regulation, and the problem of concurrent jurisdiction might face. 
In connection with the scope of “matters relating to a contract”, ECJ held: 
 
“[…] the phrase “matters relating to a contract” […] is not to be 
understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation freely 
assumed by one party towards another.”83  
 
That citing of the Court can be more clearly understood from the following wording 
about the relation of a sub-buyer and a manufacturer: 
 
“[…] Article 5(1) of the Convention [of Brussels I Regulation] is to be 
understood as meaning that it does not apply to an action between a sub-
buyer of goods and the manufacturer, who is not the seller, relating to 
defects in those goods or to their unsuitability for their intended purpose.”84 
 
                                                 
82 See, ECJ Judgment on Case 34/82, 22 March 1983, paragraphs 9-10; 
83 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-26/91, 17 June 1992, paragraph 15; 
84 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-26/91, 17 June 1992, paragraph 21; 
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Moreover, in relation to disputes on the basis of a bill of lading in sea carriage, ECJ 
declared: 
 
“[…] an action by which the consignee of goods found to be damaged on 
completion of a transport operation by sea and then by land, or by which his 
insurer who has been subrogated to his rights after compensating him, seeks 
redress for the damage suffered, relying on the bill of lading covering the 
maritime transport, not against the person who issued that document on his 
headed paper but against the person whom the plaintiff considered to be the 
actual maritime carrier, falls within the scope not of matters relating to a 
contract within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Convention [of the 
Regulation] [since the bill of lading in question does not disclose any 
contractual relationship freely entered into between the consignee and the 
defendant] […].”85  (Such an action is a matter relating to tort, delict or 
quasi-delict within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Regulation.86). 
 
The Court concerned also with the disputes being raised from the infringement of 
good-faith principle in pre-contractual relations and stated: 
 
“[…] in circumstances […] characterised by the absence of obligations 
freely assumed by one party towards another on the occasion of 
negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract and by a possible 
breach of rules of law, in particular the rule which requires the parties to 
act in good faith in such negotiations, an action founded on the pre-
contractual liability of the defendant is a matter relating to tort, delict or 
quasi-delict within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
[Brussels I Regulation].”87 
 
Obviously, from the foregoing judgments it can be concluded the following:  
                                                 
85 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-51/97, 27 October 1998, paragraphs 26 and 19; 
86 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-51/97, 27 October 1998, paragraphs 24 and 26; 
87 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-334/00, 17 September 2002, paragraph 27; 
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In order that marine litigations be considered as having matters relating to a contract 
and come under the scope of Article 5(1), Brussels I Regulation: 
 First, the litigation at issue must have been raised from a concrete and ultimately 
concluded  contract; 
 Second, the subject of the litigation must have been derived directly from that 
contract; 
 Third, the claim must have been constructed on the probable violation or request 
of fulfillment of a provision of that contract; and 
 Fourth, both the plaintiff and defendant of the litigation must have been the 
direct parties of that contract. 
Else, the question of jurisdiction should be decided in accordance with other 
provisions of Brussels I. 
It is notable that in maritime contractual relations parties to the contract might put 
the following wording into their agreement: “The rights and obligations between the parties 
of this contract are subject to X law/X convention/X rules, etc.” In such situation, question 
is raised: whether the breach of the provisions of such “X law” (convention, rules) is the 
matter relating to the contract in question or is simply a breach of lawful obligation. This 
regarding, it should be considered that the jurisdiction on disputes derived from such 
breaches must fall into Article 5(1), Brussels I. The argument of this is that, in the given 
occasions, the provisions of the specific law (convention, rules, etc.) are becoming the 
inclusive part of the concrete contract. Consequently, their violation should be perceived as 
the violation, primarily, of the contract, and the case must be caught by Article 5(1). 
And, the last issue of the concept of “matters relating to a contract” is whether the 
dispute on existence of the contract falls into Article 5(1). The answer on this question can 
be found again in ECJ case law: 
 
“In the cases provided for in Article 5(1) of the Convention [of the Brussels 
I Regulation], the national court’s jurisdiction to determine questions 
relating to a contract includes the power to consider the existence of the 
constituent parts of the contract itself, since that is indispensable in order to 
enable the national court in which proceedings are brought to examine 
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whether it has jurisdiction under the Convention [the Regulation]. […] 
Therefore, […] the plaintiff may invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
place of performance in accordance with Article 5(1) the Convention […] 
[of the Regulation], even when the existence of the contract on which the 
claim is based is in dispute between the parties.”88 
 
Consequently, litigation about the existence of a marine contract should also be 
included in the concept of “matters relating to a contract” and, respectively, the jurisdiction 
on such a dispute can come into ambit of Article 5(1). 
 
3.2.3 Place of Performance of Contractual Obligation 
 
The next question in connection with Article 5(1) of Brussels I is the method of 
determination of the place of performance of contractual obligations (PPCO) for each 
concrete case.  The considerations on PPCO partly are provided in the wording of Brussels 
I, whereas some part of it is contained in ECJ case law.  
In terms of PPCO, Brussels I Regulation divides contracts in three parts and states 
that: 
 for contracts of sales of goods, the PPCO is the place of delivery of goods - first 
indent of Article 5(1)(b). Such types of contracts in maritime relations might be, 
for instance, bunker contracts on sale of fuel for a ship;89 
 for contracts on provision of service, the PPCO is the place where, under 
contract, the service were provided or should have been provided - second 
indent of Article 5(1)(b). (For example, contracts on carriage of passengers); 
 for other types of contracts, the PPCO is decided on the basis of general 
implication of PPCO contained into Article 5(1)(a).90 (For instance, bareboat 
charter parties91). 
 
                                                 
88 See, ECJ Judgment on Case 38/81, 4 March 1982, paragraphs 7-8; 
89 See, for example, BIMCO Standard Bunker Contract; 
90 See, Article 5(1)(c), Brussels I Regulation; 
91 See, for Example, BIMCO Standard Bareboat Charter “Barecon 2001”; 
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However, the interpreting and determining of PPCO in every concrete case is not 
simple process, which is proved by several cases heard at the European Court of Justice. 
Consequently, the subsequent sentences of this sub-chapter will be holding on ECJ’s 
approaches. 
Unlike to the phrase of “matters relating to a contract”, in determining the “place of 
performance of the obligation” the ECJ gave a portion of margin of assessment to national 
courts and stated: 
 
“[…] on several occasions […] the place of performance of the obligation 
in question is to be determined by the law governing that obligation 
according to the conflict rules of the court seised.”92 
 
However, as is derived from that judgment, the mentioned margin of determination 
for domestic courts is confined only with “several occasions”, which implies that, in any 
case, the final competence of interpretation of the term “place of performance” in Article 
5(1) always lays on the ECJ. Respectively, it can be held that the courts of the EU non-
member states, including Georgian ones, in the process of deciding the venue of action 
regarding maritime contractual litigations, might have some room of defining the place of 
performance of the specific obligation under contract, nevertheless, if such room leads 
beyond the scope of Brussels I, the risk of collision and concurrent jurisdiction will stand 
posing. 
In connection with the method of defining of the place of performance of a 
contractual obligation, the ECJ ruled down: 
 
“[…] the rule of special jurisdiction set out in Article 5(1) of […] [Brussels 
I Regulation in matters relating to a contract, which complements the rule 
that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile, reflects an 
objective of proximity and the reason for that rule is the existence of a close 
link between the contract and the court called upon to hear and determine 
                                                 
92 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-420/97, 5 October 1999, paragraph 33; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-
440/97, 28 September 1999, paragraph 32; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case 12/76, 6 October 1976, paragraph 
13; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-288/92, 29 June 1994, paragraph 26;  
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the case. […] Consequently, where there are several places at which 
services are provided in different Member States, it is also necessary to 
identify the place with the closest linking factor between the contract in 
question and the court having jurisdiction, in particular the place where, 
pursuant to that contract, the main provision of services is to be carried 
out.”93 
 
The “place with the closest link factor” (from the aforementioned judgment) in 
certain contracts of carriage of goods or of passengers by sea can be understood on reliance 
of the following example of the ECJ’s another judgment concluded by the Court in relation 
to aircraft service: 
 
“[…]The services the provision of which corresponds to the performance of 
obligations arising from a contract to transport passengers by air are the 
checking-in and boarding of passengers, the on-board reception of those 
passengers at the place of take-off agreed in the transport contract in 
question, the departure of the aircraft at the scheduled time, the transport of 
the passengers and their luggage from the place of departure to the place of 
arrival, the care of passengers during the flight, and, finally, the 
disembarkation of the passengers in conditions of safety at the place of 
landing and at the time scheduled in that contract. From that point of view, 
places where the aircraft may stop over also do not have a sufficient link to 
the essential nature of the services resulting from that contract.  
 
[…] The only places which have a direct link to those services, provided in 
performance of obligations linked to the subject-matter of the contract, are 
those of the departure and arrival of the aircraft, since the words “places of 
departure and arrival” must be understood as agreed in the contract of 
                                                 
93 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-204/08, 9 July 2009, paragraphs 32 and 38; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case 
C-386/05, 3 May 2007, paragraph 22; 
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carriage in question, made with one sole airline which is the operating 
carrier.  
 
[…] It must, however, be pointed out in that regard that, unlike deliveries of 
goods to different locations, which are distinct and quantifiable operations 
for the purpose of determining the principal delivery on the basis of 
economic criteria, air transport consists, by its very nature, of services 
provided in an indivisible and identical manner from the place of departure 
to that of arrival of the aircraft, with the result that a separate part of the 
service which is the principal service, which is to be provided in a specific 
place, cannot be distinguished in such cases on the basis of an economic 
criterion.  
 
[…] In those circumstances, both the place of arrival and the place of 
departure of the aircraft must be considered, in the same respect, as the 
place of provision of the services which are the subject of an air transport 
contract.  
 
[…] the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation […] must be 
interpreted as meaning that, in the case of air transport of passengers from 
one Member State to another Member State, carried out on the basis of a 
contract with only one airline, which is the operating carrier, the court […] 
[has] jurisdiction […] at the applicant’s choice, which has territorial 
jurisdiction over the place of departure or place of arrival of the aircraft, as 
those places are agreed in that contract.”94 
 
Consequently, if going through the analogy along the above-brought cases, certain 
marine contracts might have the place of close link to the venues as follow: 
In carriage of passengers contracts, PPCO should be the agreed place of boarding 
of passengers on the ship and the agreed place of arrival. Under the Brussels I, both of such 
                                                 
94 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-204/08, 9 July 2009, paragraphs 40-43, 47; 
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places might be regarded as the place of provision of the services which are the subject of 
the contract in question, and, hence both places are to be supposed as place of performance 
of the carriage contract. Respectively, there are two choices for the plaintiff to decide 
where to bring his action. 
In carriage of cargo contracts, the question is slightly different. Here, the places 
of loading of cargo and the places of their delivery may very, if the cargo is split in two or 
more parts and the pick-up and hand-on places are several. In such a situation, the 
Regulation does not provide the exact “recipe” of deciding the action venue, but the 
question becomes the target of factual assessment. That is to say, the dispute hearing court 
should, on the basis of economic criteria, decide the place of principle delivery of the goods 
and thus determine the venue of claim.  
And finally, it is also to point that the agreements on carriage of cargo by sea should 
not be mixed in sales of goods contracts envisaged by first indent of Article 5(1)(b). Sales 
contract is different from carriage contracts from the viewpoint that the former is purely a 
sales agreement on the concrete product, enclosed with the provisions of delivery of that 
product, whereas the latter, that is, cargo carriage contract is the agreement only on service 
- to send already sold or bought goods to a specific place by a marine vessel. In other 
words, the carriage of goods contracts fits to the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) 
(jurisdiction on service contracts) and not to the first indent of Article 5(1)(b). 
 
3.2.4 Jurisdiction on Litigations Related to Breach of Multiple Contractual 
Obligations 
 
In practice it is frequently when a specific court dispute derived from a contract, 
unifies the claims on breaches (or on request for performance) on two or more contractual 
obligations. Respectively, there is a question: where is the action venue, if the places of 
performance of such different obligations are distinguished?  
In connection to Brussels I Regulation, the European Court of Justice partly 
answered that question in the following manner: 
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“[…] when a dispute relates to a number of obligations of equal rank 
arising from the same contract, the court before which the matter is brought 
cannot, when determining whether it has jurisdiction, be guided by the 
maxim accessorium sequitur principale […].  
 
[…] The same court does not therefore have jurisdiction to hear the whole 
of an action founded on two obligations of equal rank arising from the same 
contract when, according to the conflict rules of the State where that court is 
situated, one of those obligations is to be performed in that State and the 
other in another […] State.  
 
[…] It should be remembered that, while there are disadvantages in having 
different courts ruling on different aspects of the same dispute, the plaintiff 
always has the option, under Article 2 of the Convention [of the Regulation], 
of bringing his entire claim before the courts for the place where the 
defendant is domiciled.”95 
 
To this end, while there is dispute on two or more (multiple) contractual obligations 
of equal rank, the venue of action is defined under Article 2 and not according to Article 
5(1), of Brussels I.  
However, here is another question: what, if the disputed contractual obligations are 
not ranked equally and one of them (obligation) has the priority to another, that is to say, 
one is principal and the second is minor? The direct answer on that question is not found. 
Though, if taking into consideration the ECJ’s practice and its approaches referred above, it 
can be concluded that in the case of non-equal obligations, the venue of action should be 
decide also under Article 2. This is true by the following argument: 
One of the goals of contractual relations is that a contract must be performed in full. 
The aim of the pre-contractual negotiations is, amongst others, to detail all of the provisions 
of a future contract - both the principal provisions and the minor ones. This implies that 
from the legal perspective, all of the clauses of a contract must be fulfilled in full. The 
                                                 
95 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-420/97, 5 October 1999, paragraphs 39-41; 
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categorization of contractual provisions into main and secondary clauses is purely technical 
and not of in essence. Both types of such clauses always have the equal weight in terms of 
legal viewpoint of performing. Consequently, when a question is raised, it can not be surely 
say which provision of the contract at issue weighs more, that is to say, which is highly or 
lowly ranked, because the court must grant the full reparation to the “victim” party for each 
infringement of contract clauses.  
Respectively, while deciding the jurisdictional aspects of the litigation being raised 
from two or more unequally ranked contractual obligations, the Brussels I Regulation 
should be applied in the same manner as is applied with the equally ranked obligations.  
To this end, under Brussels I, maritime litigations relating to multiple contractual 
obligations should be heard in that EU Member State which is determined by Article 2 
(Brussels I Regulation), that is to say, at the place of domicile of the defendant. 
 
3.2.5 Additional Specifications of Jurisdiction on Disputes Derived from 
Employment Contracts 
 
With respect to disputes derived from employment contracts, Brussels I, besides 
Article 5(1) provides the supplementary regulations on court jurisdiction for such contracts 
as is provided in its Section 5 of Chapter II. In particular, an employer, if he is domiciled in 
the European Union, may be sued by the employee, at the employee’s option, in the venues 
as follow: 
 in the courts of the employer’s domicile Member State;96 or 
 in the courts of that Member State where the employee habitually carries out his 
work or in the courts for the last place (EU State) where he did so. If the employee 
does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any one EU country, then the 
venue of action will be the place (EU State) where the business which engaged the 
employee is or was situated.97 
 
                                                 
96 See, Article 19(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
97 See, Article 19(2), Brussels I Regulation; 
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Above, it was mentioned the term “the place where the employee habitually carries 
out his work”. One may ask: what is implied in “habitual work”? The European Court of 
Justice has given its interpretation on the term; however, before discussing the ECJ’s 
rulings, it should be mentioned one important detail. In particular, in the judgments cited 
below, the reader will notice that in relation to interpreting the phrase, the Court gave the 
falling to the litigations on employment contracts into the ambit of Article 5(1) (general 
rules on jurisdiction on disputes derived from contracts). Clearly, if taking this into 
consideration, it should be concluded that employment agreements theme for Brussels I 
Regulation is not solely separate subject to Section 5, Chapter II, but they are topics also of 
Article 5(1). In other words, the contractor of the employment contract can take an action 
as under Article 5(1), that is, at the court of the place of performance of the contractual 
obligation (for example, at place of payment of agreed salary), as under the rules mentioned 
in the beginning of this sub-chapter (Section 5, Chapter II, Brussels I). 
 One way or another, regarding an employer, he may bring proceedings against 
employee only in the court of the EU Member State in which the employee is domiciled.98 
Now, with respect to the “habitual work” term, the first issue is that ECJ does not 
leave a room for national courts to interpret this term, and holds: 
 
“[…] national law applicable to the main dispute has no bearing on the 
interpretation of the concept of the place where an employee habitually 
works, within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the convention [of the 
Regulation] […].”99 
 
The second question is linked to: which is the place of habitual work of the 
employee if he carries his contractual work in two or more Member States in parallel way? 
In this regard, the ECJ gave strict definition and confined the national courts with the 
following ruling: 
 
                                                 
98 See, Article 20, Brussels I Regulation; 
99 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-37/00, 27 February 2002, paragraph 62; 
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“[…] Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention [of the Brussels I Regulation] 
must be interpreted as meaning that where an employee performs the 
obligations arising under his contract of employment in several Contracting 
[Member] States the place where he habitually works, within the meaning of 
that provision, is the place where, or from which, taking account of all the 
circumstances of the case, he in fact performs the essential part of his duties 
vis-à-vis his employer. 
 
In the case of a contract of employment under which an employee performs 
for his employer the same activities in more than one Contracting [Member] 
State, it is necessary, in principle, to take account of the whole of the 
duration of the employment relationship in order to identify the place where 
the employee habitually works, within the meaning of Article 5(1). 
 
Failing other criteria, that will be the place where the employee has worked 
the longest. 
 
It will only be otherwise if, in light of the facts of the case, the subject-matter 
of the dispute is more closely connected with a different place of work, 
which would, in that case, be the relevant place for the purposes of applying 
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention [of the Brussels I Regulation].”100 
 
In relation to the “essential part” of performing the duties, mentioned in the above-
brought judgment, the European Court of Justice said that the reason and motivation of 
selecting the place of performing of essential part of the work as the habitual work venue is 
that “that is the place where it is least expensive for the employee to commence 
proceedings against his employer or to defend himself in such proceedings.”101 However, 
the author of this paper does not agree with that approach to “habitual work place” as being 
the “least expensive place”: because to take an action on the venue where an employee 
                                                 
100 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-37/00, 27 February 2002, paragraph 58; 
101 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-383/95, 9 January 1997, paragraph 24; 
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performs the essential part of his work can be as the least expensive as the most expensive - 
it depends on the public fees and court expenses for hearing the case, as well as on several 
other factors, and not first and foremost on the fact that an employee fulfils the essential 
part of his job there.  
The Court held also additional ruling for interpreting the “habitual work place”, in 
addition to the interpretations referred above, and declared:  
 
“[…] Article 5(1) of the Convention [of the Regulation] […] must be 
interpreted as meaning that where, in the performance of a contract of 
employment an employee carries out his work in several Contracting 
[Member] States, the place where he habitually carries out his work, within 
the meaning of that provision, is the place where he has established the 
effective centre of his working activities. When identifying that place, it is 
necessary to take into account the fact that the employee spends most of his 
working time in one of the Contracting [Member] States in which he has an 
office where he organizes his work for his employer and to which he returns 
after each business trip abroad.”102 
 
Besides, the ECJ gave “recipe” of deciding the situations when it is impossible 
towards a concrete practical fact to define the place where the employee habitually carries 
out his work: 
 
“In the event that the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice do not 
enable the national court to identify the habitual place of work, as referred 
to in Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention [of the Brussels I Regulation], 
the employee will have the choice of suing his employer either in the courts 
for the place where the business which engaged him is situated, or in the 
courts of the Contracting [Member] State in whose territory the employer is 
domiciled.”103 
                                                 
102 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-383/95, 9 January 1997, paragraph 27; 
103 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-37/00, 27 February 2002, paragraph 58; 
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And finally, it is also important to mention the ruling of European Court of Justice 
on jurisdiction for claims derived from those employment contracts which envisages the 
fulfillment of work outside the EU territory, for example, in Georgia or in high seas: 
 
“[…] in the case of a contract of employment, the obligation of the 
employee to carry out the agreed work was performed and has to be 
performed outside the territory of the Contracting States [of the Member 
States], […] in such a case jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the 
place of the defendant’s domicile in accordance with Article 2 of the 
Convention [of the Regulation].”104  
 
 To this end, as it is shown from the foregoing, jurisdiction on litigations derived 
from the marine employment contracts has it specific characteristics and is different from 
the rules being in connection to the other contractual disputes originated in maritime 
relations. 
 
 
3.2.6 Additional Specifications of Jurisdiction on Disputes Derived from 
Insurance Contracts 
 
Likewise the employment agreements, jurisdiction on litigations derived from 
insurance contracts is also the separate subject of regulating in Brussels I (Section 3 of 
Chapter II). Certainly, as a rule, the parties of such litigations are the contractors of an 
insurance agreement. However, in some occasions, the Regulation concerns also the 
situations where the claimant is an injured person other than the person who has concluded 
the concrete insurance contract.105 The right of such injured third parties to take an action, 
as usual, flows from the law operating on the specific State’s territory and, hence, disputes 
to those concerned are not derived exactly and directly from an insurance contract. Thus, in 
                                                 
104 See, ECJ Judgment on Case 32/88, 15 February 1989, paragraph 22; 
105 See, Article 11, Brussels I Regulation; 
 48 
this sub-chapter, the discussions will be held only towards the actions brought by 
policyholder, insured, beneficiary and insurer, that is, direct contractors in the insurance 
contract. The discussions in connection to injured parties vs. insurers are given above 
(Chapter 2.3.2). 
 With respect to identifying the parties to an insurance agreement, Brussels I applies 
the terms “insurer”, “co-insurer”, “policyholder”, “insured”, and “beneficiary”. In this 
regard, it should be noted that in marine practice sometimes those terms are subrogated 
with another ones, though, the meaning are almost the similar. For example, according to 
the Nordic Marine Insurance Plan, “beneficiary” might be equalized to “assured”, whereas 
“insured” can be translated as “the person effecting the insurance”.106 Regarding “a 
policyholder”, it is the party to an insurance contract as well, provided that the insurer has 
issued the policy certificate and given it to the insured.  
Brussels I enshrines that a claim based on an insurance agreement may be brought 
to the following venues: 
 in the court of the defendants domicile Member State saved for that the 
defendant is the insurer, policyholder, insured or a beneficiary;107 
 in the court of the plaintiff’s domicile Member State saved for that the plaintiff 
is a policyholder, insured or a beneficiary;108 
 in the court of the Member State where the harmful event occurred saved for 
that the litigation is derived from the liability insurance contract and the 
defendant is the insurer and domiciled in the European Union.109  
 
Besides, if the insurer is a co-insurer, and the proceedings against the leading 
insurer have already been brought in some EU State’s court, then such co-insurer can be 
sued in the same court as well.110 
To this end, the claimant of a marine insurance contract has several options pointed 
above to choose a court of an EU Member State and sue a claim against his contractor. 
                                                 
106 See, Clause 1-1, Nordic Marine Insurance Plan of 2013; 
107 See, Articles 9(1)(a) and 12(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
108 See, Article 9(1)(b), Brussels I Regulation; 
109 See, Articles 10 and 8, Brussels I Regulation; 
110 See, Article 9(1)(c), Brussels I Regulation; 
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And finally, if follow by analogy to the discussions given in the previous sub-
chapter in connection with employment contracts, it could be concluded that the disputes 
flowing from the marine insurance contracts might be judged as well as in the place where 
the place of performance of the obligation of the insurance agreement is. The only 
exception from that rule would be the litigations where the plaintiff is the insurer. With this 
latter respect, the Regulation gives the strictly confined ruling and says that an insurer may 
bring proceedings only in the courts of the Member State in which the defendant (insured, 
policyholder, beneficiary) is domiciled.111 Clearly, falling of the jurisdiction on some 
insurance contracts litigations into the ambit of Article 5(1) of Brussels I seems to be 
reasonable. 
 
 
3.3 Jurisdiction of Georgian Courts under  
Georgian National Legislation 
 
 Likewise the approach of Brussels I Regulation, PIL Act of Georgia defines 
supplementary element for jurisdiction of Georgian courts on disputes derived from the 
contractual relations. In other words, when a maritime claim concerns with the performance 
of or recovery of breach of contractual obligation, the claimant may bring the case to 
Georgian courts if the place of performance of the contractual obligation is in Georgia 
(even if the place of domicile, residence and habitual placement of the defendant is not in 
Georgia).112 
 With respect to the term of “place of performance” of contractual obligation, it is 
not defined by PIL Act; however, the “grains” of its determination can be found in the 
other national legislation of the country. 
 In particular, the general rule is that the place of fulfilling of an obligation is the 
agreed place between the contract parties (Civil Code of Georgia).113 At the same time, the 
national law, to some extent, gives also the determination of “place of performance” when 
the place is not agreed. 
                                                 
111 See, Article 12(1), Brussels I Regulation; 
112 See, Article 9(c), PIL Act of Georgia; 
113 See, Article 361(2), Civil Code of Georgia; 
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 Under the Civil Code of Georgia: 
 
“If the place of performance of the obligation neither is defined nor can 
be derived from the essence of the obligation, then the supply of articles 
[goods] shall be accomplished in the following manner: a) if the article is 
individual, at the place where the article was located at the moment of 
originating of the obligation; b) if the article is collective, at the place 
where the debtor’s company is resided; if the latter is not existing then at 
the place of his [debtor’s] legal address.”114  
 
 Besides, 
 
“In case of misleading of the place of performance of a pecuniary 
obligation, such obligation shall be performed at the place of domicile or 
legal address of the creditor. If the creditor’s banking account is not at the 
place or in the country where the payment is to be accomplished then the 
debtor may transfer the amount to the creditor’s banking account and via 
this action fulfill his pecuniary obligation, unless the creditor is not 
against of doing so.”115  
 
 If follow the implications of the aforesaid norms, it can be concluded that in case of 
when a place of performance of a contractual obligation is not agreed, such place should be 
determined in accordance with the essence of the obligation in question. Moreover, if such 
“essence” itself is ambiguous, the place of performance should be decided according to the 
linking factor of the contract subject (goods, article, place of domicile of the debtor, 
creditor) as shown above. 
 However, from the aforesaid norms one question is not completely obvious: which 
place can be regarded as place of performance of the obligation when the issue concerns 
with fulfillment of service, for instance, carrying of passengers? Is here the venue of 
                                                 
114 See, Article 362, Civil Code of Georgia; 
115 See, Article 386, Civil Code of Georgia; 
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performance of the contract country of departure or country of arrival? The clear answer on 
this question is not provided in Georgian domestic law. 
 To this end, Georgian national legislation in defining the jurisdiction of national 
courts over the claims raised from contracts (and among them from maritime agreements) 
relies on contract-performance-venue principle, thought, some issues are not obvious till 
the end and necessitate more improvement on the legislative level. 
 
 
3.4 Jurisdiction under Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974 
 
 Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974 provide several rules on court jurisdiction in relation 
to litigations derived from sea carriage contractual relations. Before focusing on those 
rules, it is worth to answer the question: what requirements must a sea carriage contract 
satisfy, in order that the litigation derived from it fall under the scope of jurisdictional rules 
of those conventions? 
 With this respect, Hamburg Rules is applicable if: 
 the port of loading of cargo, as provided for in the contract, is located in one of 
the Convention States (State Party to the Hamburg Rules); 
 the port of discharge of cargo, as provided for in the contract, is located in one 
of the Convention States; 
 one of the optional ports of discharge provided for in the contract is the actual 
port of discharge and such port is located in one of the Convention States; 
 the bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract is issued in one of 
the Convention States; or 
 the bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract provides that the 
provisions of Hamburg Rules or the legislation of any Convention State giving 
effect to them are to govern the contract.116 
 
The provisions of Hamburg Rules, and amongst them those on court jurisdiction 
over contractual disputes, are applicable without regard to the nationality of the ship, the 
                                                 
116 See, Article 2(1), Hamburg Rules; 
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carrier, the actual carrier, the shipper, the consignee or any other interested person.117 (See 
also, above Chapter 2.4) 
Nevertheless, Hamburg Rules does not apply to jurisdictional issues on claims 
derived from charter parties.118 
 Regarding to PAL 1974, the contracts on carriage of passengers may fall under its 
scope and thus the venue of action derived from such contracts can be regulated by that 
Convention, if: 
 the contract has been made in a State Party to PAL 1974; or  
 the place of departure or destination, according to the contract, is in one of the 
State Parties to PAL 1974.119  
 the carriage subject to the contract is accomplished by a ship which is flying the 
flag of or is registered in a State Party to PAL 1974;120 
 
Norms on venue of action based on contractual litigations in Hamburg Rules is 
provided in its Article 21. In particular, under that article, in judicial proceedings relating to 
carriage contract of goods by sea regulated under Hamburg Rules, the plaintiff has an 
option to choose and institute a claim in one of the following places: 
 at the principal place of business or, in the absence thereof, the habitual 
residence of the defendant; 
 at the place where the contract was made, provided that the defendant has there 
a place of business, branch or agency through which the contract was made; or 
 at the place of the port of loading or the port of discharge; as well as at any 
additional place designated for that purpose in the contract.121 
 
In regard to PAL 1974, in disputes raised from passenger carriage contracts to 
which PAL 1974 is applicable, the Convention provides the following choices for a 
claimant to take an action, that is: 
 the place of permanent residence or principal place of business of the defendant;  
                                                 
117 See, Article 2(2), Hamburg Rules; 
118 See, Article 2(3), Hamburg Rules; 
119 See, Article 2(1), PAL 1974; 
120 See, Article 2(1), PAL 1974; 
121 See, Article 21(1), Hamburg Rules; 
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 the place of departure or that of the destination according to the contract of 
carriage; 
 the State (it is implied the State Party to PAL 1974) of the domicile or 
permanent residence of the claimant, if the defendant has a place of business; 
and 
 the State (it is implied the State Party to PAL 1974) where the contract of 
carriage was made, if the defendant has a place of business in that State.122  
 
To this end, Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974 allow the claimants in maritime 
relations to sue an action at several places, whether in Georgia or another EU Member State 
which at the same time is a state party to those conventions. As it is shown from the 
foregoing the range of options for a claimant is not narrow. Moreover, this range, in certain 
aspects, goes beyond the frames of the jurisdictional rules provided by Brussels I 
Regulation and Georgian national legislation, and gives a plaintiff possibility to sue action 
at additionally other places (for instance, at venue of concluding of contract - forum 
contractus) rather than this is guaranteed by Brussels I and Georgian domestic law. 
Chapter 4 
Jurisdiction on Litigations Derived from Tort 
 
Georgian national legislation and Brussels I Regulation provide the additional 
jurisdiction for correspondingly Georgian and EU Member States’ courts on litigations 
derived from tort (delict, quasi-delict). Regarding to Hamburg Rules and PAL 1974, they 
do not contain any separate provisions with this respect. 
 Under Georgian domestic law, the “tort” is defined as the wrongful act which has 
caused harm (damage) to someone.123 At the same time, by the PIL Act it is provided that a 
court of Georgia has international competence if the dispute deals with harm (damage) 
caused by a wrongful act and such act has occurred in Georgia.124 
 Those definitions of national law are common and concern to all kind of marine 
legal relations, whether those of carriage, employment, insurance or the other. However, in 
                                                 
122 See, Article 17(1), PAL 1974; 
123 See, Article 992, Civil Code of Georgia; 
124 See, Article 9(c), PIL Act of Georgia; 
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the phrase “wrongful act […] has occurred in Georgia”, it is not entirely clear the place of 
occurrence of a tort is considered to be whether the place of the starting point of a wrongful 
act or that of the ending moment of it, or other place somehow linked to the illicit conduct. 
The respective determinations are not found in the country law.  
 Regarding to Brussels I Regulation, it in its Article 5(3) provides that: if a person is 
domiciled in the European Union, in matters relating to tort (delict or quasi-delict), he may 
be sued in the court of that EU Member State where the harmful effect of such tort (delict, 
quasi-delict) occurred or may occur.125 
 With this respect, there are several key issues to be discussed in order that the true 
essence and scope of application in maritime legal relations, of the said norm of Brussels I 
be clarified. 
 First of all, it should be mentioned the aim and goal of Article 5(3) as to why the 
place of occurrence of harmful effect is nominated as possible venue to take an action in 
tortuous relations. In this connection, ECJ held: 
 
“[…] The rule of special jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention [of the Brussels I Regulation] is based on the existence 
of a particularly close connecting factor between a dispute and the courts 
for the place where the harmful event occurred […]. The courts for the 
place where the harmful event occurred are usually the most appropriate for 
deciding the case, in particular on the grounds of proximity and ease of 
taking evidence. Those considerations are equally relevant whether the 
dispute concerns compensation for damage which has already occurred or 
relates to an action seeking to prevent the occurrence of damage.”126 
 
  As it is visible, the main goal of determination a place of tort as the action venue, 
under Article 5(3), is based on forum delicti and forum conveniens principles. 
                                                 
125 See, Article 5(3), Brussels I Regulation; 
126 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-167/00, 1 October 2002, paragraph 46; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-
189/08, 16 July 2009, paragraph 24; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case 21/76, 30 November 1976, paragraphs 
10-11; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-220/88, 11 January 1990, paragraph 17; See also, ECJ Judgment 
on Case C-68/93, 7 March 1995, paragraph 19; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-364/93, 19 September 
1995, paragraph 10;  
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 In regard to scope of “matters relating to tort” (MRTT) the ECJ gave broad 
definition and declared that: “[…] the term “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” 
within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Convention [of the Regulation] must be regarded 
as an independent concept covering all actions which seek to establish the liability of a 
defendant and which are not related to a “contract” within the meaning of Article 5(1).”127  
Clearly, the concept of MRTT, as is defined above, should not imply to cover 
indeed absolutely all actions beyond the contractual relations. In other words, besides the 
contractual and tortuous litigations, there might be also disputes which are raised in 
connection with the request of performance of certain lawful duties as is discussed above in 
Chapter 1. That is to say, claims, which request to defendant that he must fulfill an action 
derived from a concrete legal act, do not always mean that such a claim is connected 
whether to tort or to contract. And vice-versa, the tort-based claim does not necessarily 
imply the request of performance of lawful obligation, but, as usual, is linked to reparation 
of damages incurred because of tortuous act. 
 With respect to the examples from ECJ judgments when it (the Court) found 
“matters relating to tort”, some of them were brought above (Chapter 3.2.2), in particular: 
when the party of pre-contractual negotiations harms another party, the latter can claim on 
the basis of tort and not on the bases of breach of contract. As well as: when the consignee 
of sea carriage goods founds his articles damaged and starts proceedings on the basis of bill 
of lading not against the person who issued the bill of lading but against the person whom 
the plaintiff considered to be the actual maritime carrier, such litigation falls into the scope 
of Article 5(3) (MRTT). 
 Another aspect of Article 5(3) of Brussels I is the principle of determination of 
“place of occurrence of a tort (delict, quasi-delict)” (POT). In this regard, ECJ has 
concluded several judgments and made partly clear of how to define POT. One of the 
questions where such determination bears an actuality is linked to the situations when the 
place of tortuous action and the result (damage) of such action are different. With this 
respect, the Court held that: 
 
                                                 
127 See, ECJ Judgment on Case 189/87, 27 September 1988, paragraph 18; 
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“[…] where the place in which the event which may give rise to liability in 
tort, delict or quasi-delict occurs and the place where that event results in 
damage are not identical, the expression “place where the harmful event 
occurred” in Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention [Brussels I 
Regulation] must be understood as being intended to cover both the place 
where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, so 
that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the claimant, in the courts 
for either of those places […].”128 
 
 Hence, the maritime claimant can sue tortfeasor in both EU States where the 
tortuous action started and where it finalized with damages, certainly, in those cases when 
two places are in different EU countries’ territories.  
  
 Consequently, Georgian law and Brussels I for respectively Georgian and EU 
States’ courts, design additional rules on jurisdiction on claims requesting the recovery 
from tortuous acts. A plaintiff in a maritime litigation can, besides when defendant is 
domiciled or has place of residence or habitual placement in Georgia, bring proceedings for 
recovery to a Georgian court if the tort has occurred in Georgia. Under Brussels I, he 
(plaintiff) can choose and bring case whether in the defendant’s domicile EU Member 
State, or in that EU State where the tort has happened but saved for that the defendant is the 
domicile of the European Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-189/08, 16 July 2009, paragraph 23; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case 
21/76, 30 November 1976, paragraphs 24-25; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-220/88, 11 January 1990, 
paragraph 10; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-68/93, 7 March 1995, paragraph 20; See also, ECJ 
Judgment on Case C-364/93, 19 September 1995, paragraph 11; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-18/02, 5 
February 2004, paragraph 40; See also, ECJ Judgment on Case C-168/02, 10 June 2004, paragraph 16;  
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III. Conclusion 
 
 To this end, Georgian and EU Member States’ courts have jurisdiction on private 
international maritime litigations by diversity of linking factors with cases brought before 
them. Sometimes this is the domicile place of a defendant whereas in other occasions this 
derives from several other international elements. 
 The main approach which applies to all kind of marine cases is that a defendant 
may be sued in that EU Member State where he is domiciled and in Georgia if he has place 
of domicile or place of residence or habitual placement in Georgia. However, this main 
approach is complemented with several additional rules of jurisdiction in accordance with 
the ground of a claim and essence of litigation. With this respect, as it was shown above 
there are three streams of complementation: jurisdiction on certain claims of requesting the 
performance of maritime lawful obligations, jurisdiction on disputes based on marine 
contractual relations and jurisdiction on cases for recovery of tortuous damages. In other 
words, according to the specific case, a plaintiff in maritime dispute is able to sue the 
defendant at EU Member State’s court or at Georgian one whether when the linking factor 
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to action venue is the defendant’s domiciliation or when the litigation at issue is connected 
to the forum state with, for example, place of performance of contractual obligation, place 
of concluding of contract, place of tortuous action, etc. 
 Nevertheless, in maritime sphere there is frequently a situation when the place of 
performance of obligation or venue of tort (or the like) is inside either country’s state 
boundaries but is in high seas. With this respect the ECJ emphasized the flag state principle 
of a ship and explained (when he agreed the Danish court in determination the place of 
occurrence of tort): […] the nationality of the ship can play a decisive role only if the 
national court reaches the conclusion that the damage arose on board […]. In that case, the 
flag State must necessarily be regarded as the place where the harmful event caused 
damage.”129 One way or another, that judgment can not be used as universal guideline for 
deciding the jurisdiction on every specific claim related to ship-board cases. First, it is 
unclear and questionable what is implied in “damage arose on board”: whether it is damage 
arose only on board or also damage which can be arisen in/on/at a vessel’s hull or other 
part of a ship. Second, in order that nationality of a concrete ship were the decisive factor 
for determining the state territory of a country, it is to be clearly and unequivocally 
recognized, under this country’s domestic legislation and international agreements, that the 
territory of the board of the ship or of her other parts are the territory of the flag state 
(territory of the mentioned country) despite where the ship is situated: in high seas or in 
another state’s territorial waters. Therefore, this issue is subject to purely factual 
assessment for each concrete maritime dispute and not the subject to general rules. In 
domestic legislation of Georgia and in the international treaties and agreements, Georgia is 
a party to, such type of regulations does not exist. 
 Besides, it should be noted also one detail: sometimes it happens that a claimant 
brings an application to court and that application contains two or more claims with 
different characters so that one of them is under the jurisdiction of the given court and 
another is not. How should the court in question act in such situation? Clearly, the court 
must not dismiss the entire application, but it should split the application at issue and judge 
only that part of it which is under its (court’s) jurisdiction. 
                                                 
129 See, ECJ Judgment on Case C-18/02, 5 February 2004, paragraph 44; 
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 And finally, in spite of the fact that there are different jurisdictional rules whether in 
Brussels I or Georgian national legislation or Hamburg Rules or PAL 1974, there is one 
generally accepted principle that: if parties to the litigation, in the designed form, agrees on 
the specific court’s jurisdiction, they should bring the claim to such agreed court (forum 
conventionale).130 Hence, the parties of private international maritime relations always 
should take into consideration, when bringing the marine claim whether in an EU State or 
Georgia, the fact of existence of agreement on court jurisdiction, because the courts of EU 
Member States and Georgia, in most cases, have exclusive jurisdiction on the action-venue-
agreed litigations. 
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